Defining “Second or Successive” Habeas
Petitions after Magwood
Megan Volin†
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) precludes the
filing of “second or successive” federal habeas corpus petitions—when a petitioner
files a habeas petition for the second time, it will generally be dismissed. In
Magwood v Patterson, the Supreme Court held that this prohibition did not bar
the filing of a technically “second” habeas petition challenging aspects of a resentencing that resulted from the partial grant of the petitioner’s prior habeas petition.
Because this resentencing led to the entry of a new judgment, the Court explained,
the petition was not barred by AEDPA as, while it was the petitioner’s second filing
overall, it was his first petition challenging this new judgment. This Comment addresses a question explicitly reserved by the Court in Magwood: whether its holding
extends to petitioners who, rather than challenging an aspect of their resentencing,
challenge an aspect of their conviction or sentence that predates and remains unaltered by the resentencing and resulting new judgment. The circuit courts are split
as to this issue.
Based on principles of statutory interpretation, this Comment concludes that
Magwood should extend to cases in which a habeas petitioner challenges an undisturbed component of his conviction or sentence. This is first because of the principle
that the statutory language of AEDPA must be interpreted the same way in all
cases implicating the statute—the Supreme Court’s holding turned on its interpretation of this language, and this language applies regardless of what claims are
brought in a habeas petition. As the split among the lower courts stems in part
from the courts’ differing conceptions of what constitutes a new judgment, this
Comment next turns to defining a judgment, concluding that the conviction and
sentence comprise a single criminal judgment and each conviction and sentence
does not have its own distinct judgment. Because there is only one judgment, a resentencing creates a new judgment with respect to all aspects of the case and, under Magwood, a habeas petition challenging any aspect of this new judgment is not
second or successive. In addition, this extension of Magwood aligns with the purposes of AEDPA and better enables petitioners to bring meritorious challenges to
the legality of their imprisonment.
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INTRODUCTION
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19961
(AEDPA) governs the filing and adjudication of federal habeas
corpus petitions.2 A federal habeas petition may be filed by a
person in state or federal custody who wishes to challenge his
criminal conviction and sentence.3 The petition alleges that he

1
Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codified as amended in various sections of
Title 28.
2
The words “petition” and “application” are often used interchangeably when describing these filings, as the relevant statutes refer to these filings as “applications.” See,
for example, 28 USC § 2254(a) (using the term “application”). See also generally
Magwood v Patterson, 561 US 320 (2010) (using the terms “petition” and “application”
interchangeably).
3
See 28 USC §§ 2254(a), 2255(a) (describing federal remedies available to persons
in state and federal custody, respectively).
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must be released from custody on the ground that he is unlawfully detained.4 Only persons currently serving custodial sentences may file a habeas petition; habeas relief is unavailable to
those who have already completed their sentence. Note that 28
USC § 2254 governs habeas petitions filed by persons held in
state custody, while 28 USC § 2255 governs petitions filed by
federal prisoners. However, for purposes of this Comment,
whether a petitioner is in state or federal custody is immaterial.
Habeas petitions often raise multiple claims, which may
challenge the conviction, sentence, or both.5 These petitions are
complex, and the result may be that the court grants habeas relief only as to one conviction or sentence, leaving the rest of the
petitioner’s judgment undisturbed. For example, the court may
vacate only the single unlawful conviction in a multi-offense
case and leave the remaining convictions intact; alternatively, it
may find that a sentence is unlawful but leave the underlying
conviction undisturbed. In other words, a petitioner may win
only partial habeas relief—his conviction or sentence may be vacated, but he remains incarcerated.
There are several strict procedural requirements for the filing of a federal habeas petition,6 including that a habeas petitioner may not file a “second or successive” petition.7 As Part I
explains in detail, a court must dismiss a second or successive
habeas petition unless one of the few stringent statutory exceptions applies.8
When a petitioner wins partial relief after litigating a
habeas petition, any petition filed after that grant of relief is
technically second. However, in Magwood v Patterson,9 the Supreme Court held that, when a habeas petitioner has been
granted partial relief in the form of a resentencing, a

4

See 28 USC §§ 2254(a), 2255(a).
See, for example, King v Morgan, 807 F3d 154, 156 (6th Cir 2015) (explaining
that the petitioner raised seven claims—two related to his sentence and five related to
his conviction).
6
These requirements include, for example, a one-year statute of limitations that
applies to the filing of federal habeas petitions and a requirement that state prisoners
fully adjudicate their claims through the state’s postconviction procedures prior to filing
a federal habeas petition. See 28 USC §§ 2244(d)(1), 2255(f), 2254(b)(1).
7
See 28 USC § 2244(b).
8
These exceptions are: (1) the existence of a new, retroactive rule of constitutional
law that was previously unavailable or (2) newly discovered evidence that establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner would not have been found guilty. See
28 USC §§ 2244(b), 2255(h).
9
561 US 320 (2010).
5
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subsequently filed habeas petition is not subject to the limitations on second or successive petitions imposed by AEDPA.10 The
Court explained that a habeas petition can be second or successive only when it challenges the same criminal judgment that
has previously been challenged and that resentencing constitutes what the Court called a “new judgment” pursuant to which
the petitioner is imprisoned.11 Since the Magwood decision, circuit courts have split as to whether its holding applies to habeas
petitions that do not challenge any aspect of the resentencing
but instead challenge elements of the original conviction or sentence that were unaffected by the resentencing.12 In Magwood,
the petitioner challenged only errors that arose from his resentencing proceedings, and the Court explicitly declined to address this broader question.13
Courts have reached differing results based on their definitions of what constitutes a new judgment. Some circuits find
that the petitioner’s conviction(s) and sentence(s) are components of a single judgment.14 Accordingly, any change to this
single judgment creates a new judgment. This interpretation
means that, following a grant of partial relief and the entry of a
new judgment, a petitioner may challenge any and all components of that judgment, as it is all new under Magwood. This includes components of the petitioner’s conviction(s) and sentence(s) that were left unaltered by the new judgment. By
contrast, other circuits consider each individual sentence and
conviction a distinct judgment.15 When, for example, a court
grants partial relief by resentencing a petitioner but leaving his
conviction undisturbed, a new judgment arises with respect to
the petitioner’s sentence, but the distinct judgment for his conviction is unaltered. Under this view, the petitioner can bring
only a challenge alleging that errors occurred in his resentencing, as Magwood did, but he cannot bring a new challenge to his
conviction because the distinct judgment for his conviction is
unaltered.
10

Id at 331.
Id.
12 Compare generally Johnson v United States, 623 F3d 41 (2d Cir 2010), with
Suggs v United States, 705 F3d 279 (7th Cir 2013).
13 Magwood, 561 US at 342.
14 See, for example, Johnson, 623 F3d at 46 (holding that subsequent habeas challenges must be interpreted “with respect to the judgment challenged and not with respect to particular components of that judgment”).
15 See, for example, Turner v Brown, 845 F3d 294, 297 (7th Cir 2017).
11
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Resolution of this circuit split is highly important considering the frequency with which the issue arises and the nature of
the interests at stake. Significantly, the premise of a habeas petition is that the petitioner is unlawfully detained.16 Each
habeas petition filed represents a person who alleges that he is
being unlawfully imprisoned by his state or by the United
States. Accordingly, the consequences of a court’s finding that a
habeas petition is second or successive are potentially severe for
a petitioner with meritorious claims. For example, Benjamin
Kramer, whose case is discussed in detail in Part II.B, was sentenced to two concurrent terms: one for forty years’ imprisonment and one for life without parole for drug-related offenses.17
Kramer’s first habeas petition resulted in the vacatur of his forty-year sentence and the corresponding conviction, but he remained imprisoned for life based on his other conviction.18
Kramer filed a subsequent habeas petition following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v United States,19 in
which the Court reversed a conviction in factual circumstances
identical to those present in Kramer’s trial.20 However, the
Seventh Circuit found that this petition was barred as second or
successive despite recognizing that, “on the merits, Richardson
speaks to the very issue Kramer has raised throughout his confinement.”21 This means that Kramer now cannot file a habeas
petition unless it meets one of the two narrow statutory exceptions.22 Kramer is a federal prisoner,23 meaning he has no state
postconviction procedure to turn to and filing a federal habeas
petition under § 2255 is his only avenue for relief. Because the
Seventh Circuit determined that his petition was procedurally

16

See 28 USC § 2255(a):

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
17

Kramer v United States, 797 F3d 493, 496 (7th Cir 2015).
Id at 497.
19 526 US 813 (1999).
20 Compare Richardson, 526 US at 816, with Kramer, 797 F3d at 497.
21 Kramer, 797 F3d at 501.
22 A second or successive petition may be filed if it implicates newly discovered evidence or a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law established by the Supreme Court.
28 USC § 2255(h).
23 Kramer, 797 F3d at 494.
18
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barred by the second or successive provisions, Kramer will most
likely spend the rest of his life in prison for a drug offense—even
though the Supreme Court reversed the conviction in an identical case on the same grounds that Kramer raised in his procedurally barred petition.24
In addition, the frequency with which federal habeas petitions arise makes the resolution of this circuit split a significant
issue. In recent years, more than eighteen thousand federal
habeas petitions have been filed annually in the district courts.25
More than thirty-seven hundred applications seeking leave to
file a second or successive habeas petition were filed in the
courts of appeals in 2016, making up 67 percent of their original
jurisdiction cases.26 The prevalence of this issue in the federal
judicial system necessitates a resolution—it is important that
prisoners in all jurisdictions be able to properly bring their
claims related to unlawful detention in court.
This Comment assesses the circuit split and determines
that habeas petitions challenging an undisturbed component of
a judgment are not second or successive. Magwood held that a
habeas petition is not second or successive if it challenges a new
judgment, so it is important to define a new judgment in assessing the scope of Magwood. This Comment concludes that a
judgment should be defined to encompass both a petitioner’s
conviction(s) and sentence(s). Part I describes AEDPA’s limitations on second or successive habeas petitions and the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of these limitations, including its holding
in Magwood. Part II details the circuit split that has developed
regarding whether Magwood applies to habeas petitions challenging a component of the judgment that was undisturbed by a
resentencing. Part III concludes that Magwood’s holding extends
to the circuit court cases at issue in Part II.B, focusing on principles of statutory interpretation and on a definition of the term
“judgment” that is in line with Supreme Court precedent and
the use of the term in the criminal law context.

24

See id at 501–02.
US District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature
of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2015 and 2016 *3 (United States
Courts, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/K6VV-V82F.
26 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2016 (United States Courts, 2016), archived
at http://perma.cc/7HBV-RYZS.
25
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I. AEDPA AND ITS LIMITATIONS ON “SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE”
HABEAS PETITIONS
AEDPA “dramatically altered the landscape for federal
habeas corpus petitions.”27 It imposed a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of habeas petitions28 and codified the requirement that a petitioner exhaust all available state court
remedies before filing a federal habeas petition.29 Moreover,
AEDPA “established a stringent set of procedures that a prisoner . . . must follow if he wishes to file a ‘second or successive’
habeas corpus application.”30 This Part outlines the statutory
limitations on second or successive habeas petitions and explains the Supreme Court’s interpretation of these limitations
and the phrase “second or successive.”
A.

Statutory Limitations on “Second or Successive” Habeas
Petitions

The federal courts of appeals serve a “gatekeeping” function
for the consideration of second or successive petitions.31 Before
filing a second or successive petition in the district court, a petitioner must seek authorization to do so from the relevant court
of appeals.32 Under 28 USC § 2244(b), the provision of AEDPA
establishing limitations on second or successive petitions, a
court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive petition only if it determines that the petitioner’s claims
were not presented in a prior habeas petition and either a new
and retroactive constitutional rule applies or newly discovered
evidence exists.33 These are narrow exceptions to dismissal, and
the appellate courts’ decisions are not appealable.34
27

Rhines v Weber, 544 US 269, 274 (2005).
A one-year limitations period for the filing of a habeas petition runs from the latest of four dates: (1) “the date on which the judgment became final”; (2) “the date on
which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed”; (3) “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review”; or (4) “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28
USC § 2244(d)(1).
29 See Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 522 (1982); 28 USC § 2254(b)(1)(A).
30 Burton v Stewart, 549 US 147, 152 (2007), citing 28 USC § 2244(b)(1).
31 Felker v Turpin, 518 US 651, 657 (1996).
32 28 USC § 2244(b)(3)(A).
33 28 USC § 2244(b)(2). See also 28 USC § 2255(h).
34 28 USC § 2244(b)(3)(E).
28
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The provision governing habeas petitions that challenge
federal convictions, § 2255, incorporates the second or successive
limitations of § 2244: “A second or successive motion must be
certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals.”35 Courts interpret the limitations on second or successive habeas petitions in the same way with respect to both § 2254 petitions filed by state prisoners and § 2255
petitions filed by federal prisoners.36 Accordingly, there is no distinction between habeas petitions filed under § 2254 and § 2255
for purposes of this Comment.
The next Section lays out the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statutory second or successive doctrine described
above. In particular, Magwood addressed the application of
AEDPA’s second or successive limitations when a petitioner has
been granted partial relief prior to the filing of his technically
second petition and prompted a circuit split regarding the scope
of its holding.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of “Second or
Successive”

The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to hold that
“second or successive” merely refers to all habeas petitions filed
“second or successively in time.”37 Instead, second or successive
is a “term of art.”38 The Court has also explained that “preAEDPA cases cannot affirmatively define the phrase ‘second or
successive’ as it appears in AEDPA.”39 Accordingly, it relies on
AEDPA’s text rather than pre-AEDPA precedent.40
35

28 USC § 2255(h).
See Suggs v United States, 705 F3d 279, 283 n 1 (7th Cir 2013) (“[T]he bar on
second or successive challenges under section 2254 is parallel to the bar under section 2255.”); Johnson v United States, 623 F3d at 45 (“[N]othing in [ ] AEDPA indicates
that Congress intended the ‘second or successive’ rules to operate differently with regard
to state and federal prisoners.”).
37 See Panetti v Quarterman, 551 US 930, 947 (2007) (holding that § 2244’s bar on
second or successive applications does not apply to applications raising claims of incompetency to be executed under Ford v Wainwright, 477 US 399 (1986), which are filed as soon
as these claims become ripe); Slack v McDaniel, 529 US 473, 485–86 (2000) (holding that a
habeas petition filed after an initial petition was dismissed without adjudication on the
merits was not second or successive); Stewart v Martinez-Villareal, 523 US 637, 644 (1998)
(“[N]one of our cases . . . have ever suggested that a prisoner whose habeas petition was
dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, and who then did exhaust those remedies
and returned to federal court, was by such action filing a successive petition.”).
38 Magwood, 561 US at 332.
39 Id at 337.
40 Id at 337–38.
36
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In Magwood, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition
after being sentenced to death for the murder of a sheriff.41 The
district court upheld the conviction but vacated the sentence
upon finding that the trial court had failed to consider mitigating circumstances during sentencing. However, following a resentencing proceeding, the petitioner was again sentenced to
death.42 The petitioner filed a second habeas petition—
challenging his new death sentence on the grounds that he had
not had fair warning at the time of the offense that his conduct
could warrant a death sentence—which the district court
granted.43 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the habeas petition to be second or successive because the claim raised could
have been raised in his initial petition, as the same error had
previously occurred.44
In the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the second
or successive limitation bars only subsequent habeas applications that challenge the same judgment, and because his resentencing created a new judgment, his habeas application challenging that new judgment could not be second or successive.45
The state, by contrast, argued that AEDPA bars individual
claims, rather than entire habeas petitions, as second or successive.46 Accordingly, the claim the petitioner raised was successive because he had the opportunity to make the same argument
in his initial habeas application but declined to do so.47 The
state’s reasoning was in line with the Eleventh Circuit’s approach below, which was to “separate the new claims challenging the resentencing from the old claims that were or should
have been presented in the prior application.”48
The Court agreed with the petitioner. Writing for the
majority, Justice Clarence Thomas explained that AEDPA’s second or successive limitations apply only to “an ‘application for a
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
41

Id at 324–26.
Magwood, 561 US at 326.
43 Id at 327–28.
44 Magwood v Culliver, 555 F3d 968, 975–76 (11th Cir 2009). Because the
petitioner’s claim “challenged the trial court’s reliance on the same (allegedly improper)
aggravating factor that the trial court had relied upon for [the petitioner’s] original sentence, his claim was governed by § 2244(b)’s restrictions on ‘second or successive’ habeas
applications.” Magwood, 561 US at 329, quoting Magwood v Culliver, 555 F3d at 975–76.
45 Magwood, 561 US at 331.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Magwood v Culliver, 555 F3d at 975.
42
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to the judgment of a [ ] court.’” 49 Indeed, Magwood emphasized
AEDPA’s reference to a “judgment,” concluding that “the phrase
‘second or successive’ must be interpreted with respect to the
judgment challenged.”50 Accordingly, the Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit, holding that “where . . . there is a new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions, . . . an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second
or successive’ at all.”51 That holding rested on the Court’s interpretation of the phrase “second or successive”: a habeas petition
cannot be second or successive unless it challenges the same
judgment that was previously challenged.
In rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s claims-based approach,
the Court noted that “[a]n error made a second time is still a
new error.”52 The Court also rejected the state’s purposivist argument that barring the petition “better reflects AEDPA’s purpose of preventing piecemeal litigation and gamesmanship.”53
Over the dissent’s objection, the Court explained: “We cannot
replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress’ intent.”54
The Court, however, explicitly declined to address the question raised in this Comment, explaining:
The State objects that our reading of § 2244(b) would allow
a petitioner who obtains a conditional writ as to his sentence to file a subsequent application challenging not only
his resulting, new sentence, but also his original, undisturbed conviction. The State believes this result follows because a sentence and conviction form a single “judgment”
for purposes of habeas review. This case gives us no occasion to address that question, because Magwood has not attempted to challenge his underlying conviction.55
Prior to Magwood, many circuits held that a petitioner who
is resentenced “may challenge only the ‘portion of a judgment
that arose as a result of’” the resentencing.56 However, since the
Supreme Court decided Magwood, courts have extended its

49

Magwood, 561 US at 332, quoting 28 USC § 2254(b)(1).
Id at 332–33.
51 Id at 341–42 (quotation marks omitted).
52 Id at 339.
53 Magwood, 561 US at 334.
54 Id. See also id at 350–51 (Kennedy dissenting).
55 Id at 342.
56 Id at 342 n 16, quoting Lang v United States, 474 F3d 348, 351–52 (6th Cir 2007)
(collecting cases).
50
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holding to cases involving challenges to resentenced petitioners’
underlying convictions. This has led to a circuit split, with the
circuits’ positions on the issue turning on how they interpret
AEDPA’s bar on second or successive petitions and how they define a new judgment. Magwood held that a habeas petition is
not second or successive when it challenges a new judgment, but
the circuits disagree on what constitutes this new judgment.
Part II describes and analyzes this circuit split.
II. POST-MAGWOOD APPLICATIONS OF THE “SECOND OR
SUCCESSIVE” LIMITATIONS TO CHALLENGES TO UNDERLYING
CONVICTIONS
The circuits have applied Magwood in varying ways with
respect to petitioners who challenge an unamended component
of their judgment in a second-in-time habeas petition. Some
courts hold that Magwood’s reasoning applies to these cases because, instead of considering each component of a judgment separately, courts must look to the judgment as a whole. Because
the judgment comprises each of the petitioner’s conviction(s) and
sentence(s), a change to any one conviction or sentence creates
an entirely new judgment. This means that a petitioner may
then challenge an undisturbed conviction or sentence, as the entirety of the judgment is “new,” so such a challenge is not “second or successive” under Magwood. Other courts rely on preMagwood precedent to hold that Magwood does not apply to
these cases. These courts hold that each conviction and sentence
bears its own distinct judgment. The result of this is that a
change to one conviction or sentence does not enable the petitioner to challenge an original undisturbed conviction or sentence, as the distinct judgment for the original conviction or sentence is not new. Because the Court explicitly declined to
address the question, this issue remains open for debate. The
courts that extend Magwood to these cases must grapple with
the fact that AEDPA does not draw any distinction between the
two classes of cases involved—those in which the petitioner challenges an error arising from his resentencing and those in which
he challenges an undisturbed component of his judgment.

1556
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The Johnson Approach

Prior to Magwood, several circuits held that, following a resentencing, a habeas petitioner could challenge only an error
that arose from that resentencing.57 After Magwood, however,
the Second Circuit reversed course, finding that Magwood applies when a habeas petitioner challenges an unamended component of his sentence and overruling its prior precedent to the
contrary.58 The Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—
and to a lesser extent, the Sixth Circuit—all followed the Second
Circuit’s lead in finding that Magwood applies to these cases.59
1. The Second Circuit’s holding in Johnson.
In Johnson v United States,60 the first court of appeals case
to apply Magwood, the Second Circuit extended Magwood’s
holding to a case in which the petitioner sought to challenge
components of his convictions and sentences that were unmodified by the outcome of his prior habeas petition.61 In Johnson,
the petitioner was convicted of bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and the use of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence.62 The petitioner filed a federal habeas petition, which resulted in the Second Circuit vacating his conviction and
sentence for bank robbery on double jeopardy grounds.63 Later,
the petitioner sought leave from the court of appeals to file a second or successive petition, alleging that the court instead
should have vacated his other convictions and sentences, which
carried longer terms of imprisonment.64
The court noted that “[a] judgment of conviction includes
both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence”65 and relied on
Magwood’s holding that, when “there is a new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions, . . . an application
challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive’ at all.”66 So “where a first habeas petition results in an
57

See, for example, Lang, 474 F3d at 351–52 (collecting cases).
Johnson v United States, 623 F3d 41, 44–46 (2d Cir 2010) (overruling Galtieri v
United States, 128 F3d 33 (2d Cir 1997)).
59 See Part II.A.2–3.
60 623 F3d 41 (2d Cir 2010).
61 Id at 42–43.
62 Id at 42.
63 Id at 42–43.
64 Johnson, 623 F3d at 43.
65 Id at 46, quoting Deal v United States, 508 US 129, 132 (1993).
66 Johnson, 623 F3d at 46, quoting Magwood, 561 US at 341–42.
58
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amended judgment, a subsequent petition is not successive regardless of whether it challenges the conviction, the sentence, or
both.”67 As a result, the Second Circuit found that, under
Magwood, neither the fact that the petitioner’s claims could
have been raised previously nor that the petitioner challenged
an unamended component of the judgment warranted dismissing his habeas petition.68 It reached this conclusion because subsequent habeas applications must be interpreted “with respect
to the judgment challenged and not with respect to particular
components of that judgment.”69
Because the court concluded that the habeas application
would not be “second or successive” under Magwood, the court
found that it did not need to grant the petitioner permission to
file. Accordingly, the court denied the petitioner’s application for
leave to file a second or successive petition as unnecessary, allowing the petitioner to file a “first” petition in the district court.
In reaching this conclusion, the court overruled circuit precedent
that had applied a claims-based approach.70 Though it recognized that the Magwood court had declined to address the question at issue, the Second Circuit nevertheless concluded that its
circuit precedent was irreconcilable with Magwood because the
latter emphasized the presence of a new, intervening judgment.71 The Second Circuit’s definition of a “new judgment” as
comprising both the sentence and the conviction meant that
Magwood must apply to these cases despite the Supreme Court’s
reservation.
2. Courts adopting Johnson.
Several circuits subsequently adopted the Second Circuit’s
holding that, under Magwood, “where a first habeas petition results in an amended judgment, a subsequent petition is not successive regardless of whether it challenges the conviction, the

67
68
69
70

Johnson, 623 F3d at 46.
Id.
Id.
Prior to Johnson, the Second Circuit held that a subsequent petition

will be regarded as a ‘first’ petition only to the extent that it seeks to vacate the
new, amended component of the sentence, and will be regarded as a ‘second’
petition to the extent that it challenges the underlying conviction or seeks to
vacate any component of the original sentence that was not amended.
Id at 44, quoting Galtieri, 128 F3d at 37–38.
71 Johnson, 623 F3d at 44–45.
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sentence, or both.”72 Indeed, since Johnson, the Second Circuit
has been joined by four of its sister circuits.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in
Wentzell v Neven.73 In Wentzell, the petitioner was convicted of
solicitation to commit murder, attempted murder, and theft.74
He filed a habeas petition, which was dismissed on the ground
that it was filed outside AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.75 He then filed a state habeas petition, which resulted in
the dismissal of his conviction and sentence for solicitation to
commit murder.76 He later filed a second federal petition challenging the remaining counts, which the district court dismissed
sua sponte as “second or successive.”77 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit agreed with Johnson’s conclusion that a habeas petition
filed after an intervening judgment has been entered is not second or successive even when it challenges an unamended component of the judgment.78 The court explained that it “treat[s]
the judgment of conviction as one unit, rather than separately
considering the judgment’s components, i.e., treating the conviction and sentence for each count separately.”79 Accordingly, the
petitioner’s second-in-time federal habeas petition was not second or successive because the state court had entered a new
judgment.80
The Eleventh Circuit was next to follow suit in Insignares v
Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.81 In that case, the
petitioner was convicted of attempted first-degree murder with a
firearm, criminal mischief, and discharging a firearm in public.82
After his first 28 USC § 2254 petition was dismissed, the petitioner filed a state motion to correct his sentence, which resulted
in the entry of a new judgment that reduced his attempted murder sentence but otherwise left his convictions and sentences for
criminal mischief and discharging a firearm undisturbed.83 The
72

Id at 46.
674 F3d 1124 (9th Cir 2012).
74 Id at 1125.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Wentzell, 674 F3d at 1126.
78 Id at 1127 (treating Johnson as “persuasive”).
79 Id at 1127–28.
80 Id at 1128.
81 755 F3d 1273 (11th Cir 2014).
82 Id at 1276. The petitioner’s criminal mischief conviction was vacated in a state
court proceeding not relevant to the Magwood issue. Id at 1277.
83 Id at 1276.
73
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petitioner then filed a second habeas petition, which the district
court found was not second or successive under Magwood because it was the first to challenge the new judgment entered at
the resentencing. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, explaining that
“there is only one judgment, and it is comprised of both the sentence and the conviction.”84 Because “the ‘existence of a new
judgment is dispositive,’” 85 the court concluded that a habeas petition is not second or successive when it is the first to challenge
a new judgment regardless of whether it challenges the sentence
or the underlying conviction.86
The Third Circuit also adopted Johnson’s reasoning in an
unpublished opinion, In re Brown.87 In Brown, the petitioner was
convicted of first degree murder, arson, and a violation of the
Pennsylvania Corrupt Organizations Act88 (PACOA).89 He filed a
habeas petition that resulted in his PACOA conviction and sentence being vacated.90 After resentencing, the petitioner filed a
second petition, challenging his remaining convictions and sentences. Like the Second Circuit, the Brown court held that,
“where a first habeas petition results in an amended judgment,
a subsequent petition is not successive regardless of whether it
challenges the conviction, the sentence, or both.”91
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit adopted Johnson’s logic in
In re Gray.92 In Gray, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death.93 His first habeas petition resulted in a resentencing to life imprisonment.94 The petitioner
then sought leave to file a second or successive petition, challenging his underlying conviction.95 The Fourth Circuit recognized that, “when a defendant is resentenced, he or she is confined pursuant to a new judgment even if the adjudication of
guilt is undisturbed.”96 Accordingly, the court held that, “when a
prisoner’s successful habeas petition results in a new,
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id at 1281.
Insignares, 755 F3d at 1281, quoting Magwood, 561 US at 338.
Insignares, 755 F3d at 1281.
594 Fed Appx 726 (3d Cir 2014).
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 911.
Brown, 594 Fed Appx at 726.
Id at 727.
Id at 729, quoting Johnson, 623 F3d at 46.
850 F3d 139 (4th Cir 2017).
Id at 140.
Id.
Id.
Gray, 850 F3d at 142.
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intervening judgment, the prisoner’s first habeas petition to
challenge that new judgment is not second or successive within
the meaning of § 2244(b), regardless of whether the petition
challenges the prisoner’s sentence or underlying conviction.”97
Each of the courts discussed above adopted Johnson’s reasoning in its entirety. However, as explained in the following
Section, the Sixth Circuit took a more limited approach to
Johnson. Although it accepts Johnson’s conception of AEDPA’s
second or successive limitations, it takes a distinct approach to
defining a “judgment.”
3. The Sixth Circuit’s limited approach to Johnson.
The Sixth Circuit adopted some of Johnson’s reasoning in
King v Morgan.98 In King, the petitioner was convicted of two
counts of murder and one count of felonious assault and was
sentenced to twenty-one years to life in prison.99 After his first
federal habeas petition was dismissed, the petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence in state court. The state trial court
granted King a resentencing, but the new judgment it entered
imposed a greater sentence than before—thirty-three years to
life.100 King then filed a second federal habeas petition, and the
district court dismissed the claims challenging his underlying
conviction as second or successive.101 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit reversed, explaining that Magwood’s judgment-based
approach “naturally applies to all new judgments, whether they
capture new sentences or new convictions or merely reinstate
one or the other.”102 The court also explained that a “judgment”
includes both the conviction and the sentence.103 Therefore, the
Sixth Circuit agreed with the Johnson court that, following a resentencing, a petition challenging the underlying conviction is
not second or successive.104

97

Id at 144.
807 F3d 154 (6th Cir 2015).
99 Id at 156.
100 Id. The increase in the petitioner’s sentence was due to the fact that the court
imposed consecutive sentences following the resentencing, while it had previously imposed concurrent sentences. Id.
101 Id. The district court also dismissed claims challenging the resentencing on other
procedural grounds. Id.
102 King, 807 F3d at 157.
103 Id at 157–58, quoting Deal, 508 US at 132 (“As a matter of custom and usage, . . . a
judgment in a criminal case ‘includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence.’”).
104 King, 807 F3d at 159.
98
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However, in a subsequent case, the Sixth Circuit limited its
interpretation of Magwood to cases involving “a new, worsethan-before sentence.”105 The court in Crangle v Kelly106 found
that, in “cases in which a limited resentencing benefits the prisoner,” the original judgment is undisturbed and continues to
constitute a final judgment.107 The court concluded that “a reduced sentence is not a new one,” while “[a] new, worse-thanbefore sentence, by contrast, amounts to a new judgment.”108
While the Sixth Circuit still follows the Johnson approach
when determining whether habeas petitions filed after the entry
of a new judgment are second or successive,109 its definition of a
“new judgment” differs drastically from that applied by the
other circuits. This choice is significant, as it seems that the majority of the cases implicating Magwood (across all circuits) involve resentencing proceedings that have benefitted the petitioner—often through the vacatur of a sentence and conviction
or the reduction of a sentence.110 It does not appear that the
Sixth Circuit has had the occasion to decide a case involving a
sentence that is not “worse-than-before.” However, Crangle’s

105 Crangle v Kelly, 838 F3d 673, 678 (6th Cir 2016). See also Burks v Raemisch, 680
Fed Appx 686, 691 (10th Cir 2017) (observing that “the Sixth Circuit limited its holding”
to “resentencings that constitute a ‘new, worse-than-before sentence’”).
106 838 F3d 673 (6th Cir 2016).
107 Id at 678.
108 Id. It is not entirely clear why the Sixth Circuit reached this conclusion. It seeks
to justify its “worse-than-before” rule by drawing an analogy to a line of cases involving
sentence modifications entered under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2). Id. These sentence modifications benefit the prisoner and, pursuant to the statute, they do not require a full resentencing proceeding and do not result in the entry of a new judgment. Section 3582 simply
allows a court to adjust a sentence in order to comply with changes to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. However, § 3582(c)(2) was not the basis for the change to the petitioner’s sentence in Crangle. In fact, Thomas Crangle was a state prisoner to whom this
federal sentencing statute does not apply. Id at 675. Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s “worsethan-before” standard is only consistent with, not based on, § 3582 and does not apply
only in cases that implicate that statute.
109 See King, 807 F3d at 159. Because it allows a petitioner to challenge an underlying conviction after a new judgment is entered, the Sixth Circuit technically follows
Johnson. However, it is worth noting that, because of its definition of a new judgment,
the Sixth Circuit would likely decide Johnson and many of the cases that follow it differently than other circuits, as the resentencings in these cases benefitted the petitioners.
See, for example In re Gray, 850 F3d at 140 (explaining that the petitioner’s first habeas
petition resulted in a resentencing at which his sentence was reduced).
110 See, for example, Wentzell, 674 F3d at 1125 (explaining that the petitioner’s
state habeas proceeding resulted in the vacatur of one of three consecutive sentences).
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definition of a new judgment has been applied by district courts
within the Sixth Circuit.111
B.

The Seventh and Tenth Circuits’ Approach

Diverging from Johnson and its progeny, the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits hold that a habeas petition is “second or successive” when it is filed after partial relief has been granted in the
form of a resentencing and it challenges an original, undisturbed
conviction or sentence. This finding that a petition is second or
successive bars habeas petitioners from having their claims related to unlawful detention heard unless they meet one of the
two narrow statutory exceptions—a new and retroactive rule of
constitutional law or newly discovered evidence.112
In Suggs v United States,113 the Seventh Circuit noted that
Magwood explicitly declined to address this situation and therefore relied on pre-Magwood circuit precedent to hold that a petition challenging an underlying condition was barred as second
or successive.114 In Suggs, the petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute and subsequently filed a habeas petition challenging his conviction and
sentence.115 This resulted in a resentencing by the district court.
Subsequently, the petitioner sought authorization to file a second or successive petition, which the Seventh Circuit denied.116
The petitioner filed a new habeas petition anyway, arguing that
it should not be barred as second or successive because his resentencing imposed a new judgment.117 Magwood was decided
shortly thereafter, and the petitioner argued that it applied to
his case. However, the district court dismissed his petition as second or successive, and the petitioner appealed to the Seventh
Circuit.

111 See, for example, Camara v Haviland, 2016 WL 7407540, *6 (ND Ohio) (“The
Sixth Circuit noted . . . the distinction between a limited resentencing that benefits a
defendant (such as a sentence reduction) and a ‘new, worse-than-before-sentence.’ [sic]
. . . Only the latter, the Court suggested, ‘amounts to a new judgment’ for statute of limitations purposes.”), citing Crangle, 838 F3d at 678; Brown v Harris, 2018 WL 1629103,
*9 (SD Ohio) (finding that “Brown’s present sentence is not ‘worse than before’”).
112 See notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
113 705 F3d 279 (7th Cir 2013).
114 Id at 280–81.
115 Id at 281.
116 Id.
117 Suggs, 705 F3d at 281.
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In reaching its result, the Suggs court relied on Dahler v
United States,118 pre-Magwood Seventh Circuit precedent, to
hold that the petitioner’s application was second or successive.119
Dahler distinguished between “challenges to events that are
novel to the resentencing (and will be treated as initial collateral
attacks) and events that predated the resentencing (and will be
treated as successive collateral attacks).”120 In Dahler, the court
found that “a belated challenge to events that precede a resentencing must be treated as a collateral attack on the original
conviction and sentence, rather than as an initial challenge to
the latest sentence.”121 Dahler “looked to what the motion
actually challenged to determine whether a motion following a
resentencing was ‘second or successive.’” 122 Essentially, if the errors alleged arose prior to the resentencing, the petition was second or successive.123
The Seventh Circuit later applied Suggs in Kramer v United
States.124 There, the petitioner was convicted of conspiring to distribute marijuana and of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise.125 His initial habeas petition resulted in his marijuana
conviction and sentence being vacated and the remaining conviction and sentence being affirmed.126 The petitioner then filed another petition challenging the criminal enterprise conviction,
which the district court dismissed as second or successive.127 The
petitioner argued that Suggs was distinguishable because it involved only the vacatur of a sentence, not a conviction.128 The
court did not find this distinction meaningful, as both cases involved challenges to convictions left undisturbed by the result of
the petitioners’ initial habeas petitions. In fact, the court found
that Suggs likely had a stronger claim than Kramer had: “The
conviction that Suggs sought to challenge was the very one that
resulted in both the vacated and new sentences. In Kramer’s case,
he is seeking to challenge an entirely separate conviction.”129
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

259 F3d 763 (7th Cir 2001).
See Suggs, 705 F3d at 280–81.
Dahler, 259 F3d at 765.
Id.
Suggs, 705 F3d at 283.
Id.
797 F3d 493 (7th Cir 2015).
Id at 494.
Id.
Id.
Kramer, 797 F3d at 501.
Id.

1564

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:1545

The Seventh Circuit’s approach also differs from Johnson in
the way that the court defines a “new judgment.” In Dahler, the
court explained that the petitioner “had one collateral attack . . .
but is entitled to another to the extent he attacks a different
conviction or sentence. One substantive chance per judgment is
the norm.”130 The court seems to construe each individual conviction and sentence as a separate “judgment,” contrary to the
way judgment is defined by the courts that follow the Johnson
approach.131
Recently, in Turner v Brown,132 the Seventh Circuit clarified
its definition of a judgment in a case involving AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations, not its second or successive limitations. In 1995, the petitioner was convicted of murder, criminal
confinement, and attempted robbery.133 A state postconviction
proceeding in 2013 resulted in the reduction of the robbery conviction from a Class A to a Class B felony and a resentencing on
the robbery conviction.134 After the state court granted this resentencing, the petitioner filed a federal habeas petition challenging his sentence for murder. The district court dismissed the
petition, holding that it was barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. The petitioner argued that “the date on which
the judgment became final”—the relevant date from which
AEDPA’s statute of limitations runs—was the date of his resentencing in 2013 because this resentencing imposed a new judgment under Magwood.135
The court found that the relief granted in 2013 did not reset
the statute of limitations. Because “the relief he was granted in
2013 was limited to his robbery conviction, whereas his habeas
petition challenge[d] his conviction and life sentence for murder,” the court found the relevant judgment for purposes of

130

Dahler, 259 F3d at 764.
See, for example, Insignares, 755 F3d at 1281 (“[T]here is only one judgment, and
it is comprised of both the sentence and the conviction.”). It is worth noting that Judge
Diane Sykes, dissenting in Suggs, echoed the Johnson approach. See Suggs, 705 F3d at
287–88 (Sykes dissenting):
131

[A] habeas petition is deemed initial or successive by reference to the judgment
it attacks—not which component of the judgment it attacks or the nature or
genesis of the claims it raises. It is well understood that “a judgment of conviction includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence.”
132
133
134
135

845 F3d 294 (7th Cir 2017).
Id at 295.
Id.
Id at 296, citing 28 USC § 2244(d)(1)(A).
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timeliness to be the 1995 judgment for murder.136 The court expanded on its definition of judgment, rejecting the idea that
there is only one judgment and explaining:
[T]he state may pursue convictions on as many crimes as it
likes, and it may then seek as many judgments as it likes.
AEDPA’s one-year time limit will then run from each judgment. Turner’s 2013 resentencing led the state to enter
another judgment, but the timeliness of his habeas petition is
calculated based on the date of the final judgment that his
petition challenges—that is, his 1995 judgment for murder.137
Essentially, the Seventh Circuit holds that each individual
sentence and conviction yields a separate judgment. Each of
these distinct judgments affects AEDPA’s statute of limitations
and second or successive bar only with respect to claims that
challenge that distinct judgment. Claims challenging a separate,
undisturbed judgment remain subject to AEDPA’s procedural
bars. The court went on to apply Suggs to the case, explaining
that the “murder conviction and life sentence were unaffected by
the 2013 resentencing and thus remained final.”138 Although
Turner involved the application of AEDPA’s one-year statute of
limitations, rather than its second or successive limitations, it is
still helpful to consider as the Seventh Circuit expands on its
holding in Suggs and its interpretation of Magwood.
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has shown reluctance to adopt a broad interpretation of Magwood. In the
statute of limitations context, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
Seventh Circuit’s position in Turner, indicating it is likely to
take the same approach in second or successive cases. In Burks v
Raemisch,139 the petitioner was convicted of sexual assault on a
child and enticement of a child.140 Years later, the trial court,
sua sponte, instigated proceedings that resulted in a reduction
in the petitioner’s sentences and a resentencing.141 The
136

Turner, 845 F3d at 297.
Id.
138 Id at 298.
139 680 Fed Appx 686 (10th Cir 2017).
140 Id at 687.
141 See id at 688. Though it was not clear from the record, the Tenth Circuit assumed that the trial judge took this action because he found that the petitioner’s original
sentence violated the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998. Id at 688
n 3. This statute provides that a convicted sex offender’s minimum sentence be no more
than twice the presumptive maximum sentence for the class of felony for which he was
convicted when there are “extraordinary aggravating . . . circumstances” found. Id, citing
137
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petitioner then filed a habeas petition, which the district court
dismissed as barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.142 Like in Turner, the petitioner argued that the statute of
limitations began to run when he was resentenced rather than
when his original convictions and sentences became final.143
The court was emphatically against allowing the petitioner
to file a habeas petition in this situation, asking: “Are longsettled matters, untouched by the resentencing, somehow resurrected, Lazarus like, for reconsideration? More particularly, is a
new breath of habeas life constitutionally required in such
cases? An emphatic and tautological answer—NO—might, logically, seem to be the order of the day.”144
The Burks court, like the Seventh Circuit, applied its preMagwood circuit precedent to conclude that, because the petitioner’s claims did not arise from the resentencing, “it did not
renew the limitations clock as to those claims.”145 Relying on
Prendergast v Clements,146 the court explained that § 2244’s
statute of limitations should be applied on a “claim-by-claim basis,” instead of looking at the habeas application as a whole.147
The court noted that Magwood rejected a “claim-by-claim” approach but declined to extend Magwood because “Burks challenges only his original, undisturbed conviction and maximum
sentence, not his newly reduced minimum sentence,” a situation
that Magwood expressly declined to address.148
C.

Summary of the Circuit Split and the Categories of Cases It
Encompasses

Because the cases have varying procedural postures, it is
helpful to divide them into two categories in assessing this circuit split. The first category comprises cases involving convictions for multiple offenses, in which the conviction and sentence
Vensor v People, 151 P3d 1274, 1275 (Colo 2007) and Colo Rev Stat § 18-1.3-401(6). Each
of the felonies for which the petitioner was convicted were class-four felonies, with a presumptive maximum sentence of six years. Burks, 680 Fed Appx at 688. He was originally
sentenced to eight years for each count, which, because it exceeded the presumptive
maximum, was impermissible due to the lack of aggravating circumstances. Id.
142 Burks, 680 Fed Appx at 688.
143 Id at 689.
144 Id at 687.
145 Id at 690.
146 699 F3d 1182 (10th Cir 2012).
147 Burks, 680 Fed Appx at 690 (explaining that “[t]he point of Prendergast is that
we apply § 2244(d)(1) on a claim-by-claim basis”).
148 Id at 691.
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for one or more offenses have been vacated while the conviction
and sentence for the remaining offense(s) are left undisturbed.
These vacatur cases encompass Johnson, Wentzell, Brown, and
Kramer.149 The second category, the resentencing cases, encompasses Gray, King, Insignares, Suggs, and Burks.150 The second
category includes cases involving convictions for either one or
multiple offenses in which a resentencing has occurred but no
conviction has been altered.
The cases that permit challenges to an underlying conviction do so based on the courts’ capacious conception of what constitutes a judgment. As the Second Circuit explained in
Johnson, “a judgment of conviction includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence. . . . [W]here a first habeas petition
results in an amended judgment, a subsequent petition is not
successive regardless of whether it challenges the conviction, the
sentence, or both.”151 The courts that followed Johnson adopted
this broad understanding. For instance, the Ninth Circuit found
that it should not “separately consider[ ] the judgment’s components, i.e., treating the conviction and sentence for each count
separately.”152 In addition, some courts extended Magwood to
these cases despite conflicting circuit precedent. The Second
Circuit, for example, found that it could not reconcile Magwood’s
judgment-based approach with prior circuit precedent, which dictated that whether a subsequently filed habeas petition was “second or successive” depended on whether its claims challenged an
amended or an unamended component of the judgment.153
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Kramer declined to apply Magwood in part because the petitioner was “seeking to
149 These cases come from the Second, Ninth, Third, and Seventh Circuits, respectively. The Second, Ninth, and Third Circuits held that the petitions at issue were not
second or successive and allowed them to proceed, while the Seventh Circuit held that
the petition was barred as second or successive.
150 These cases come from the Fourth, Sixth, Eleventh, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits,
respectively. The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits held that the petitions at issue were
not second or successive and allowed them to proceed, while the Seventh Circuit held that
the petition was barred as second or successive. Burks, the Tenth Circuit case, concerned
AEDPA’s statute of limitations rather than its limitations on second or successive petitions,
but the court applied similar reasoning to that of the Seventh Circuit in Suggs to hold that
Magwood did not apply because a new judgment had not been entered.
151 Johnson, 623 F3d at 46 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
152 Wentzell, 674 F3d at 1127–28.
153 Johnson, 623 F3d at 44, citing Galtieri, 128 F3d 33. The court concluded: “In
light of Magwood, we must interpret successive applications with respect to the judgment challenged and not with respect to particular components of that judgment.”
Johnson, 623 F3d at 46.
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challenge an entirely separate conviction” from the one that had
previously been vacated.154 Clearly, the court did not view the
convictions and sentences imposed for separate offenses as part
of the same “judgment.” The court expanded on its conception of
a judgment in Turner, in which it expressly bifurcated the petitioner’s judgment by offense in concluding that Magwood did not
apply.155
The courts are divided when it comes to both categories of
cases. It is true that several circuits have not yet heard cases
coming from both categories. However, there is no reason to
think that courts following the Johnson approach in the vacatur
cases would deviate from that approach when deciding resentencing cases. There is a clear connection between the conviction
and sentence stemming from a single offense, and these courts
rely on the idea that “there is only one judgment, and it is comprised of both the sentence and the conviction.”156 It is, however,
less clear that courts that follow the Johnson approach when deciding resentencing cases would continue to do so when facing
vacatur cases. With vacatur cases, the connection between the
components of the judgment that have been vacated and the
components of the judgment subsequently challenged in a
habeas petition is more attenuated. The Seventh Circuit opined
that there is an “arguably stronger” argument that petitions in
resentencing cases are not second or successive than there is for
petitions in vacatur cases,157 as in vacatur cases, the petitioner is
challenging “an entirely separate conviction” than the one implicated by the resentencing.158
Part III seeks to resolve this circuit split, focusing on principles of statutory interpretation to conclude that, in all cases,

154
155

Kramer, 797 F3d at 501.
The court explained:

Turner contends that his 2013 resentencing reset the clock for calculating
AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The problem with Turner’s position, however,
is that the relief he was granted in 2013 was limited to his robbery conviction,
whereas his habeas petition challenges his conviction and life sentence for
murder. Thus, the judgment that is relevant for purposes of his present petition is the one from 1995.
Turner, 845 F3d at 297. This illustrates the court’s belief that there is a distinct judgment attached to each conviction in a multi-offense case.
156 Insignares, 755 F3d at 1281.
157 See Kramer, 797 F3d at 501 (“Suggs had an arguably stronger claim than
Kramer that, under Magwood, his motion should be considered non-successive.”).
158 Id.
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Magwood permits a habeas petitioner to challenge the undisturbed components of his judgment following a resentencing.
III. THE JOHNSON APPROACH IS CORRECT AS A MATTER OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND COMPORTS WITH AEDPA’S
PURPOSES
Under Magwood, a second-in-time petition filed by a resentenced habeas petitioner challenging an undisturbed component
of his judgment (such as an underlying conviction) is not “second
or successive” under AEDPA. This conclusion follows first from
Magwood’s interpretation of the statutory phrase “second or
successive.”159 Because of the well-recognized principle that
statutory terms cannot be given different interpretations in different cases, this holding must also apply to petitions challenging an undisturbed component of a judgment.160 Part III.A addresses this canon of construction.
Since the application of Magwood depends on whether a
new judgment has been entered, it is also necessary to determine how a “judgment” should be defined. As Part III.B explains, the Johnson interpretation that both a conviction and a
sentence constitute a single judgment comports with both
Supreme Court precedent under AEDPA and the common definition of judgment found in other contexts. Finally, applying
Magwood to habeas petitions that challenge an undisturbed
component of the judgment results in a more streamlined and
practical approach that does not unfairly prejudice petitioners
and that is in line with the purposes of AEDPA. Part III.C addresses these practical considerations.
A.

Magwood’s Interpretation of Statutory Provisions Must
Apply to All Cases Arising under the Statute

Importantly, Magwood’s holding depends on statutory interpretation. As the Court explained: “This case turns on the
meaning of the phrase ‘second or successive’ in § 2244(b). More
specifically, it turns on when a claim should be deemed to arise
in a ‘second or successive habeas corpus application.’” 161 The
Court found that § 2244(b) “appl[ies] only to a ‘second or
successive’ application challenging the same state-court
159
160
161

Magwood, 561 US at 342.
See generally Clark v Martinez, 543 US 371 (2005).
Magwood, 561 US at 330, quoting 28 USC § 2244(b)(1), (2).
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judgment.”162 The Court reached its conclusion by looking to the
“statutory context,” finding “the phrase ‘second or successive’
must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged.”163
The Court grounded its holding fully in its interpretation of the
statute when it found that “AEDPA uses the phrase ‘second or
successive’ to modify ‘application,’” rather than “claim,” stating:
“We cannot replace the actual text with speculation as to
Congress’ intent. We have previously found Congress’ use of the
word ‘application’ significant, and have refused to adopt an interpretation of § 2244(b) that would elide the difference between
an ‘application’ and a ‘claim.’” 164
Accordingly, Magwood is, at its core, premised on statutory
interpretation. Its discussion of the meaning of “second or successive” in § 2244(b) turns entirely on the statutory text and
does not depend on the fact that Magwood’s claims challenged
only his resentencing.165 This same statutory text applies to all
federal habeas petitions—including both those that challenge an
aspect of the petitioner’s resentencing and those that challenge
an undisturbed component of his judgment. The words of the
statute cannot be given different meanings dependent on the
content of the habeas petition and the claims that are raised.
The Supreme Court has applied this canon of statutory interpretation before in cases analogous to Magwood.166 This Section discusses these cases and apply their holdings to Magwood. This
discussion leads to the conclusion that courts should apply
Magwood’s definition of “second or successive” to all cases arising under AEDPA, including those that challenge an undisturbed component of the petitioner’s judgment.
1. The Supreme Court’s holdings in Zadvydas and Clark.
It is a well-established principle that statutory text must be
given the same meaning in all cases arising under a statute. The
Supreme Court has applied this principle in cases involving 8
USC § 1231(a)(6), an immigration statute analogous to AEDPA.
Just like in Magwood, the Court in Zadvydas v Davis167 interpreted a statute in the context of only one class of cases that
162
163
164
165
166
167

Magwood, 561 US at 331.
Id at 333.
Id at 334.
See Magwood, 561 US at 331–33.
See generally, for example, Clark, 543 US 371.
533 US 678 (2001).

2018]

Defining "Second or Successive" Habeas Petitions

1571

may arise and explicitly declined to extend its holding to the
other classes of cases governed by the statute. Later, in Clark v
Martinez,168 the Court extended its holding in Zadvydas to the
remaining classes of cases, concluding that the statutory text
must be applied in the same way to all cases arising under the
statute and that its prior reservation of the issue with respect to
other classes of cases did not warrant a different result.169
Clark and Zadvydas both concerned § 1231(a)(6), a statute
authorizing the detention of three classes of immigrants ordered
removed from the United States.170 The three classes of immigrants covered by the statute are those who have been ordered
removed from the United States and are inadmissible to the
United States, those who have been ordered removed because of
criminal activity, and those who have been ordered removed and
who the Secretary of Homeland Security deems to be a risk to
the community or a flight risk.171 The statutory text does not distinguish between these classes, merely providing that they all
“may be detained beyond the removal period.”172 Zadvydas involved the second of the three classes of immigrants—those who
have been ordered removed from the United States because of
criminal activity.173 In Zadvydas, the Court held that the statutory provision that the government “may” detain removable immigrants did not confer unlimited discretion to detain, but only
authorized detention for a “reasonably necessary” duration,
which is presumptively set at six months.174 The Court explicitly
declined to extend its holding to another class of cases
implicated by the statute—those involving immigrants who have
not yet been admitted to the United States at all.175 It explained
that these immigrants “would present a very different question,”176 highlighting the “well established” distinction immigration law draws between immigrants present in the United
States and those who have never entered and the fact that

168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

543 US 371 (2005).
Id at 378.
Id at 377; Zadvydas, 533 US at 682.
Clark, 543 US at 377, citing 8 USC § 1231(a)(6).
Clark, 543 US at 377, quoting 8 USC § 1231(a)(6).
Zadvydas, 533 US at 682.
Id at 697, 699, 701.
Id at 682.
Id.
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certain constitutional protections do not apply to prospective
immigrants who have not yet entered the country.177
Despite the substantive differences between the classes of
immigrants subject to § 1231(a)(6), the Supreme Court
ultimately extended its interpretation of the statute to all classes. In Clark, the Court held that the statutory construction
adopted in Zadvydas must apply to the other classes of cases
arising under the statute because “[t]o give these same words a
different meaning for each category would be to invent a statute,
rather than interpret one.”178 Clark concerned immigrants who
are inadmissible to the United States—the class of immigrants
to which the Zadvydas court had explicitly declined to extend its
holding. It may have been reasonable for the Court to distinguish between the two classes of immigrants given the differences between them. The Court addressed the fact that the constitutional concerns underlying Zadvydas are not implicated in
cases of inadmissible immigrants179 and made note of the argument that inadmissible immigrants may present border security concerns.180 However, the Court found that the statutory
text overrides any differences between the classes of immigrants, highlighting the “dangerous principle that judges can
give the same statutory text different meanings in different
cases.”181 Clark made it clear that the text of the statute and
the Court’s prior interpretation of that text control in all cases
implicating § 1231(a)(6) even in the face of countervailing
policy considerations.
In addition, the Clark Court was not persuaded by the argument that, because Zadvydas had expressly reserved the
question of whether its holding applied to the other classes of
cases, it must not apply. The Court responded to that argument
by observing that “[t]his mistakes the reservation of a question
with its answer.”182 The Court went on to conclude that,
although it had previously refused to decide the question at issue, “because the statutory text provides for no distinction
177 Zadvydas, 533 US at 693–94 (“But once an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”).
178 Clark, 543 US at 378.
179 Id at 380.
180 Id at 386.
181 Id.
182 Clark, 543 US at 378.
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between admitted and nonadmitted aliens, we find that [each
case] results in the same answer.”183
Importantly, the Clark court adhered to its previous interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) despite substantive differences between
the classes of cases to which it applies. This suggests that the
same statutory text should not be interpreted in different ways
across different classes of cases even when there may be rational
policy justifications for treating the classes differently.
2. Courts should apply Clark’s reasoning in extending
Magwood.
In Magwood, just like in Zadvydas, the Court interpreted a
statutory provision in the context of just one class of cases that
can arise under the statute: habeas petitions that challenge new
errors arising from a resentencing.184 Also, like in Zadvydas, the
Court declined to extend its holding to the other class of cases
that can arise under the statute: those challenging an undisturbed component of a petitioner’s judgment.185 In Magwood, the
Court held that “the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged” and that “second or successive” applies to entire habeas applications rather
than claims.186 This interpretation of § 2244(b) applies no matter
what the content of a habeas petition is or what the claims it
raises are, as the Court did not impose any limitations on its
construction of the statute. Based on Clark’s principle that statutory language must be given the same meaning in all classes of
cases, Magwood’s construction of the phrase “second or successive”—that a petition is not second or successive if filed after the
entry of a new judgment—must apply to all such petitions regardless of the claims they raise or which components of the
judgment they challenge.
One counterargument is that a habeas petition challenging
an undisturbed component of the petitioner’s judgment raises
greater concerns for the finality of criminal judgments and is
more likely to contain abusive claims,187 thus warranting a
stricter application of AEDPA’s second or successive limitations.
183

Id at 379.
See Magwood, 561 US at 339.
185 Id at 342 (“This case gives us no occasion to address that question, because
Magwood has not attempted to challenge his underlying conviction.”).
186 Id at 333.
187 See id at 352–54 (Kennedy dissenting).
184
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However, as explained above, similar arguments were made in
Clark,188 and the Court still determined that the statutory text
must be applied in the same way in all classes of cases regardless of the distinct constitutional and public safety concerns implicated by each class of cases. As explained above, Clark’s principle of interpreting statutory terms consistently applies despite
the existence of contrary policy concerns. Since Clark was
decided, the Supreme Court has made this principle even
clearer, rejecting the idea of “giving the same word, in the same
statutory provision, different meanings in different factual contexts.”189 In United States v Santos,190 the Court explained that
Clark had “forcefully rejected” this concept.191
The Johnson approach correctly applies § 2244(b)’s second
or successive limitations uniformly by extending Magwood’s
holding to cases in which a petitioner challenges an undisturbed
component of his judgment. By contrast, the Suggs approach
leads to the anomalous result that courts interpret the statutory
phrase “second or successive” differently in different classes of
cases, contrary to Clark. The Suggs courts apply their preMagwood claims-based approaches to interpreting the phrase
“second or successive” in cases in which a habeas petitioner challenges his underlying conviction while at the same time considering themselves bound to Magwood’s interpretation of the
phrase when an error arising from a resentencing is challenged.
The result is that Magwood’s definition of second or successive
applies only in the latter class of cases, while, in the former,
habeas petitions are dismissed based on a different conception of
second or successive. These circuits’ claims-based approaches
are in conflict with the rule announced in Magwood. The
Seventh Circuit “look[s] to what the motion actually challenged to
determine whether a motion following a resentencing was ‘second
or successive.’”192 Magwood, by contrast, requires courts to look
only to whether a new judgment has been entered when determining whether a habeas petition is second or successive and not
to the substance of the habeas petition or the claims it raises.

188 See Clark, 543 US at 386 (noting the government’s argument that border security concerns justified a harsher interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) with respect to inadmissible
immigrants).
189 United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 522 (2008).
190 533 US 507 (2008).
191 Id at 522.
192 Suggs, 705 F3d 279, 283 (7th Cir 2013).
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The Seventh and Tenth Circuits state that Magwood’s construction of § 2244(b) does not apply to cases in which a habeas
petitioner challenges his underlying conviction in large part because there must be a distinction if Magwood reserved the question of whether its holding applies to these cases.193 Accordingly,
the courts apply pre-Magwood circuit precedent. However, this
reasoning is unpersuasive. The Clark defendants offered a parallel argument, contending that the Zadvydas Court’s express
reservation of the question of whether its holding applied to
other classes of cases was an indication that these different classes of cases warranted a different approach.194 The Clark Court
rejected this argument, explaining that it would “mistake[ ] the
reservation of a question with its answer.”195 However, this is essentially the argument the Seventh Circuit adopted in Suggs by
adhering to its circuit precedent based primarily on Magwood’s
reservation. The Seventh Circuit inferred from the Supreme
Court’s reservation that there must be some distinction between
the two classes of cases at issue.
Courts should not mistake Magwood’s reservation of the
question of whether its holding applies to petitions that challenge an undisturbed conviction with its answer.196 AEDPA’s bar
on second or successive habeas petitions does not distinguish between these classes of cases. It applies to all classes of habeas
petitioners—including those who challenge their underlying
convictions—just like the statute at issue in Zadvydas and
Clark applies to multiple classes of immigrants. Nothing in the
text of § 2244(b) distinguishes between habeas petitioners who
challenge errors arising from a resentencing and those who challenge errors introduced prior to a resentencing. Because of
§ 2244(b)’s lack of distinction between classes of cases, there

193

See id at 284:

Because the question before us is settled in our circuit and the Supreme Court
considered the question but expressly declined to answer it, we follow our circuit’s precedents and hold that Suggs’ motion is second or successive. . . . [W]e
believe it would be premature to depart from our precedent where the Court
has not asked us to.
See also Burks, 680 Fed Appx at 690–91 (noting that, absent an on-point Supreme Court
decision, pre-Magwood circuit precedent is binding).
194 Clark, 543 US at 378.
195 Id.
196 See id.
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should not be a distinction in how its text is applied across these
classes of cases.197
There is, however, one important difference between
AEDPA and 8 USC § 1231(a)(6), the statute at issue in Clark
and Zadvydas. Section 1231(a)(6) explicitly lists the classes of
cases to which it applies,198 while 28 USC § 2244(b), containing
AEDPA’s second or successive limitations, does not. Arguably,
because the statute does not expressly provide for habeas petitions that challenge an unamended component of a petitioner’s
judgment, courts may have more discretion to treat these petitions differently and exempt them from Magwood’s interpretation of the statute. However, this is not persuasive. The provisions of each statute must be applied in the same way to all
cases to which the statute applies—in the immigration context,
the set includes only three classes of cases, but in the AEDPA
context, the set contains all prisoners, including those whose
habeas petitions challenge their underlying convictions. Section 1231(a)(6) enumerates the classes of immigrants to which it
applies in order to limit its scope—it does not apply to all immigrants who have been ordered removed from the United
States.199 While § 1231(a)(6) applies only to a subset of immigrants, § 2244(b) applies to all prisoners, not merely a subset of
prisoners. Section 2244(b)’s limitations on second or successive
habeas petitions are incorporated into both § 2254 (governing all
people in state custody) and § 2255 (governing all people in federal custody).200 Therefore, § 2244(b) applies to all state and federal prisoners—categories which certainly encompass petitioners challenging their underlying convictions. That § 2244(b) does
not expressly provide for these habeas petitioners does not mean
the Court’s interpretation of the statute does not apply to
them—it just means that the statute is not limited to only them.
Accordingly, the Johnson approach is proper as a matter of
statutory interpretation. Any time courts are faced with a
second-in-time federal habeas petition, they should determine if
it is second or successive by looking to whether a new
197

See id at 379.
8 USC § 1231(a)(6) (“An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible . . . , removable [for criminal activity,] . . . or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be
a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal.”).
199 For example, § 1231(a)(6) does not apply to immigrants who have been ordered
removed for “failure to register or falsification of documents” under 8 USC § 1227(a)(3).
See 8 USC § 1231(a)(6).
200 See 28 USC § 2244(b)(1)–(2); 28 USC § 2254(a); 28 USC § 2255(a), 2255(h).
198
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intervening judgment has been entered, as this is the definition
given to the phrase “second or successive” by the Supreme Court
in Magwood. It remains important to determine how “new
judgment” should be defined because Magwood’s interpretation
of second or successive turns on the existence of a new judgment, and the Court does not precisely define this term.
B.

Defining a “New Judgment”

Magwood’s holding also turns on how a “new judgment” is
defined. The Court held that a habeas petition is not second or
successive when it challenges a new judgment but did not provide an explicit definition of what constitutes a new judgment,
and there remains a dispute as to how this term is defined.201
There are two main definitions courts use to determine whether
a new judgment has been entered such that a petitioner may file
a second-in-time habeas petition that is not second or successive.
Courts that follow Johnson hold that “there is only one judgment”202 comprised of both the sentence(s) and the conviction(s).
When a petitioner has been convicted of multiple offenses, these
courts still “treat the judgment of conviction as one unit” and do
not “treat[ ] the conviction and sentence for each count
separately.”203 By contrast, the courts following Suggs treat each
conviction and sentence as its own judgment for purposes of
AEDPA.204 The Sixth Circuit takes a unique approach to defining a judgment—it holds that only “[a] new, worse-than-before
sentence . . . amounts to a new judgment.”205
These courts do not take a methodical approach to defining
what constitutes a judgment. For example, the Ninth Circuit in
Wentzell explained its definition of a new judgment in one sentence, briefly taking note of circuit precedent pertaining to the
finality of judgments,206 and the Seventh Circuit in Turner relied
201 See notes 45–51 and accompanying text (describing the Magwood decision) and
notes 149–53 and accompanying text (describing the ensuing dispute among the circuits).
202 Insignares, 755 F3d at 1281.
203 Wentzell, 674 F3d at 1124, 1127–28. See also Johnson, 623 F3d at 46 (finding, in a
multi-offense case, that the court “must interpret successive applications with respect to
the judgment challenged and not with respect to particular components of that judgment”).
204 See Turner, 845 F3d at 297.
205 Crangle, 838 F3d at 678.
206 Wentzell, 674 F3d at 1127–28, citing United States v Colvin, 204 F3d 1221, 1226
(9th Cir 2000) (holding that, when any conviction or sentence is remanded to the district
court following direct appeal, the judgment does not become final for purposes of
AEDPA’s statute of limitations until the district court has acted on the remand and the
time has passed for the defendant to appeal).
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on the idea that each sentence and conviction has a separate
judgment without citing any support for that contention.207
Other courts have also addressed the issue quite briefly.208
This Section begins by addressing definitions of “judgment”
that exist in other contexts of criminal and habeas law, concluding that the common definition of a judgment includes both the
sentence and the conviction. Next, this Section argues that this
common definition of judgment should apply in the second or
successive context, primarily due to Clark’s principle that the
same statutory term cannot be given different meanings in different contexts. Finally, this Section turns to the Sixth Circuit’s
unique definition of judgment, concluding that the Sixth Circuit
should likewise adopt the more common definition of a judgment.
1. Defining a “judgment” in related areas of law.
There is substantial support from both the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that a criminal “judgment” constitutes both the conviction and the sentence. First, Rule 32(k)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure defines a judgment in federal criminal
proceedings.209 That rule provides that “[i]n the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the
court’s findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.”210 This indicates that, at least in federal criminal cases, when a trial court
enters its judgment, that judgment must include both the sentence and the conviction (or “adjudication”).
Also, federal courts recognize that both the conviction and
sentence must be entered before the judgment is reviewable on
appeal. Courts of appeals “ordinarily lack jurisdiction to review
decisions made before sentencing is complete and a judgment of
conviction has been entered” unless the collateral order doctrine
applies. 211
In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that the adjudication of a criminal case results in only one judgment, which

207

Turner, 845 F3d at 297.
See King, 807 F3d at 157–58 (6th Cir 2015) (finding that the judgment includes
both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence), citing FRCrP 32(k)(1); In re Gray, 850 F3d
139, 141–42 (4th Cir 2017), citing Deal v United States, 508 US 129, 132 (1993) (noting that
the combination of the conviction and the sentence constitutes the judgment).
209 FRCrP 32(k)(1).
210 FRCrP 32(k)(1).
211 See, for example, United States v Robinson, 473 F3d 487, 490 (2d Cir 2007).
208
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encompasses both the conviction and the sentence. In Deal v
United States,212 the Court explained that, while “‘conviction’ refers to the finding of guilt by a judge or jury that necessarily
precedes the entry of a final judgment,” a judgment “includes
both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence.”213 Although
Deal was decided prior to the passage of AEDPA, the Court has
continued to apply this definition of a judgment in the context of
AEDPA. Relying on the same logic as Deal, in Burton v
Stewart,214 the Court explained that AEDPA’s one-year statute
of limitations, which runs from “the date on which the judgment
became final,”215 “did not begin until both [the petitioner’s] conviction and sentence became final.”216 Also, Johnson and several
of the cases following its approach recognize that Deal’s definition of a judgment applies.217
It appears as though courts commonly recognize that a
judgment is one unit, comprised of both the sentence and the
conviction, in related areas of law. Courts use this definition
when applying AEDPA’s statute of limitations which, like its
“second or successive” limitations, depends on the existence of a
judgment. They also use it to determine when a case becomes
reviewable on appeal, and it is the definition adopted by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Section next argues
that this common definition of judgment should be applied in
the context of AEDPA’s second or successive limitations, particularly because it also applies in the context of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations.
2. Applying the common definition of “judgment” to the
“second or successive” provisions of AEDPA.
The common definition of a judgment described above
should apply in the context of AEDPA’s limitations on second or
successive habeas petitions. This is, most importantly, because
it is the definition applied to the term “judgment” in the context
of AEDPA’s statute of limitations under § 2244(d). The Clark
principle provides that the same statutory term cannot be given
a different meaning in different contexts. It follows that the
212
213
214
215
216
217

508 US 129 (1993).
Id at 132, citing FRCrP 32(b)(1) (1996).
549 US 147 (2007).
Id at 156, citing 28 USC § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Burton, 549 US at 156 (quotation marks omitted).
See Johnson, 623 F3d at 46; Gray, 850 F3d at 141; King, 807 F3d at 157–58.
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term “judgment,” which is used in the same way in the context of
both the statute of limitations and the second or successive bar,
should be given the same definition in both of these contexts.
Although Burton involved the statute of limitations imposed
by § 2244, rather than its second or successive limitations, the
term judgment cannot mean something different in the context
of second or successive petitions. As Part III.A.1 explains, the
same statutory term cannot be construed to mean something different in different factual circumstances. Magwood derived its
judgment-based approach from § 2254, the provision governing
habeas petitions filed by state court prisoners, because the
§ 2244 bar on second or successive petitions references § 2254.
Section 2254(b)(1) describes “an ‘application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court.’” 218 Significantly, the same statutory text that
the Court relied on in Magwood—which is found in
§ 2254(b)(1)—also appears in § 2244(d)(1), the provision establishing the one-year statute of limitations.219 Section 2244(d)(1)
applies AEDPA’s statute of limitations to “an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court.”220 Therefore, based on Clark’s principle that the same statutory language cannot be given different
meanings in different contexts, the Deal and Burton definition of
a judgment that applies in the context of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations must also apply in the context of second or successive habeas petitions.
Arguably, Clark is not controlling when it comes to the definition of a judgment. Clark involved the application of a single
statutory provision to different cases, while Burton and
Magwood involve two separate provisions that happen to contain the same language—§ 2244(d)(1), governing the statute of
limitations, and § 2254(a). Perhaps Clark’s reasoning applies

218 Magwood, 561 US at 332, quoting 28 USC § 2254(b)(1). Similarly, § 2254(a) refers to a person in custody “pursuant to the judgment” of a state court. Recall that,
although Magwood involved a state prisoner, AEDPA’s limitations on second or successive habeas petitions are interpreted the same way with respect to both § 2254 petitions
brought by state prisoners and § 2255 petitions brought by federal prisoners.
219 28 USC § 2244(d)(1) provides that the statute of limitations applies to “an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court” and runs from the date that the judgment became final. 28 USC
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). This text is nearly identical to the text of § 2254(b)(1) quoted by the
Magwood court.
220 28 USC § 2244(d)(1).
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only to the interpretation of the same statutory provision and
not to the interpretation of the same language located in different parts of the statute. However, this argument is not persuasive. Courts often use the same reasoning in statute of limitations cases and second or successive cases. For example, in
Crangle, the Sixth Circuit found that the petitioner’s “worsethan-before” sentence constituted a “new judgment” under
Magwood and, therefore, that it reset AEDPA’s one-year statute
of limitations.221 Also, in Insignares, the Eleventh Circuit relied
in part on Burton’s definition of a judgment to decide a second or
successive case.222 Turner and Burks also apply Magwood to
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, rather than its second or successive limitations. Perhaps the argument against applying Clark
would carry more weight if this were an attempt to define two
unrelated statutory provisions uniformly. However, § 2244(d)(1)
and § 2254(a) are two closely related provisions of the same
statute, and courts use similar reasoning in interpreting both
provisions and the same cases to support holdings related to
both provisions. Given these factors and the identical nature of
the statutory language, it would seem unreasonable to conclude
that the term “judgment” means something different in each
provision.
Concluding that the definition of a judgment imposed by
Deal and Burton should apply in cases involving AEDPA’s statute of limitations but not in cases involving its second or successive limitations would invoke “the dangerous principle that
judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in
different cases.”223 Burton holds that a judgment is comprised of
both the sentence and the conviction in statute of limitations
cases, and courts should adopt this same definition in second or
successive cases. Accordingly, the Johnson approach to defining
a judgment as comprised of both the sentence and the conviction
is correct—it comports with both the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Supreme Court’s definition of a judgment in a
criminal case.
221 Crangle, 838 F3d at 679–80. See also Turner, 845 F3d at 297 (responding to the
petitioner’s argument that Magwood applies not only to AEDPA’s second or successive
limitations but also to its statute of limitations by contending that the problem with this
argument is not that different statutory provisions are implicated but that the petitioner
sought to challenge a different judgment than the one previously challenged); Burks, 680
Fed Appx at 691.
222 Insignares, 755 F3d at 1280–81.
223 Clark, 543 US at 386.
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3. Applying the common definition of “judgment” in the
Sixth Circuit.
If the Sixth Circuit’s unique definition of a “new judgment”224
were correct, Magwood would almost never apply. When a habeas
petitioner is granted partial relief, he either wins the vacatur of a
conviction and its corresponding sentence, or he wins a resentencing due to a problem with his original sentence. Cases in which
these positive outcomes for the petitioner could produce a “worsethan-before” sentence should be rare. Also, it is significant that
none of the sources of the definition of judgment discussed above
mentions the length of the sentence.225 Whether a judgment exists
does not depend on the characteristics of the sentence it imposes
but simply on whether it imposes a sentence at all. By requiring
an increased sentence to be imposed in order for a new judgment
to be entered, the Sixth Circuit rejects the common definition of a
judgment applied by the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit
should adopt the common definition of a judgment as being comprised of both the conviction and the sentence without the
heightened requirement that the new sentence be worse than before in order for the judgment to be new.
C.

The Johnson Approach Is Both Pragmatic and Consistent
with AEDPA’s Purposes

By applying Magwood’s holding to habeas petitions that
challenge an undisturbed component of a judgment and by defining a “judgment” to be comprised of both a sentence and a
conviction, the Johnson approach is correct as a matter of statutory interpretation and in line with the well-accepted definition
of a criminal judgment. Following Johnson is also the normatively correct approach. It is both practical and streamlined, and
it comports with the purposes of AEDPA that have been recognized by the Supreme Court. The Court is generally concerned
with promoting efficiency while also protecting a petitioner’s
ability to seek relief.226
First, habeas petitioners often raise multiple claims in the
same petition. A claim might be related to the conviction(s), the

224

See Part II.A.3.
See notes 204–13 and accompanying text.
226 See Panetti v Quarterman, 551 US 930, 945 (2007) (“The statute’s design is to
further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.”) (quotation marks omitted);
Duncan v Walker, 533 US 167, 179 (2001).
225
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sentence(s), or both. When a petitioner raises multiple claims in
a technically second habeas petition, the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits would allow the district court to adjudicate claims related only to the resentencing while requiring the petitioner to
seek authorization from the court of appeals to file a “second or
successive” habeas petition with respect to the remaining
claims. By essentially splitting the petition in two, this approach
requires the involvement of two courts at the same time rather
than one and also requires both the petitioner and the government to litigate in multiple courts at the same time. AEDPA requires that petitioners seek permission from the court of appeals
to file a second or successive habeas petition—the district court
may only adjudicate petitions that are not second or successive
or that have received authorization from the court of appeals.
A crucial problem with this approach arises when the same
claim relates to both the resentencing and the underlying conviction. The parties would then be involved in litigation related
to the exact same issue in multiple courts, wasting judicial resources and potentially leading to delay or inconsistent results
within the same case. Consider, for example, a Sixth
Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Assume,
for simplicity’s sake, that a petitioner has had the same attorney
for the duration of his case, that this attorney made the same
error during both the trial and a later resentencing proceeding,
and that the petitioner had filed an initial habeas petition prior
to this resentencing. In a subsequent habeas petition, the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits would allow the petitioner to bring
the claim of error at the resentencing, as it arose during the resentencing. However, the claim of error at the trial stage would
be second or successive, as the error could have been raised in
an initial petition prior to the resentencing. Although both
claims implicate the same constitutional error of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner would have to bring the claim
of error arising at the trial stage to the court of appeals in order
to get authorization to litigate it in the district court, while the
claim of error arising from the resentencing could be brought in
the district court with no authorization needed. This outcome is
not only inefficient, but also may lead to inconsistent and unjust
results. The petitioner may be correct that his counsel acted unconstitutionally at both the trial stage and the resentencing
stage. But if the court of appeals denies authorization to attack
his conviction on this ground, the best the petitioner can do is
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win another resentencing—he cannot challenge his conviction,
so his conviction cannot be vacated.
The Johnson approach to determining what constitutes a
judgment is also more practical. In multi-offense cases,
defendants are tried and convicted at the same time, before the
same judge and jury, for multiple offenses. Often, these offenses
arise from the same alleged course of conduct.227 It is logical to
think of these closely interrelated convictions and sentences as
components of the same judgment, rather than as each bearing
its own judgment. By bifurcating judgments by each offense and
conviction, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits separate things that
are logically related and arose from the same events. For
example, in Indiana v Turner,228 the petitioner was convicted of
murder, criminal confinement, and attempted robbery resulting
in serious bodily injury. These charges all stemmed from an alleged incident in which the petitioner and two friends enticed a
man into their car, attempted to rob him, and, upon learning he
had no money, shot and killed him.229 After Turner received a
new sentence on a reduced charge for the robbery conviction,230
the Seventh Circuit found that a new judgment had been entered for his robbery conviction.231 However, his murder conviction was governed by his original, distinct judgment, which was
entered eight years earlier at the time of his trial.232 According to
the Seventh Circuit, even though Turner’s convictions all
stemmed from the same conduct, they each had a separate
judgment, and therefore AEDPA’s statute of limitations and second or successive provisions applied differently to each of them.
AEDPA’s procedural limitations, when applied to each distinct
judgment, might often produce a different result even though
each of these judgments are so closely related to each other. This
creates unnecessarily complex results that may be prejudicial to
the petitioner. For example, in a case like Turner when each
offense is so closely related, the same constitutional error may
have affected each conviction. As an example, say that the police
227 See, for example, Wentzell, 674 F3d at 1125 (noting that the defendant was found
guilty for both solicitation to commit murder and attempted murder). See also Jeffery M.
Chemerinsky, Note, Counting Offenses, 58 Duke L J 709, 711–25 (2009) (collecting cases
involving multiple offenses related to the same course of conduct).
228 2011 WL 9523125 (Ind Super).
229 Id at *1–6.
230 Turner, 845 F3d at 295.
231 Id at 297.
232 Id.

2018]

Defining "Second or Successive" Habeas Petitions

1585

used unlawfully obtained evidence in Turner. If this evidence
underlies his original convictions as well as his separate, “new”
robbery conviction, he can challenge it only with respect to the
robbery conviction under the Suggs approach. He is precluded
from raising such a claim with respect to his original, undisturbed convictions even though they may just as likely be unlawful. Following the Johnson approach streamlines habeas proceedings by allowing petitioners to bring all of their interrelated
claims together, at the same time, in one court.
In addition, although Magwood explicitly rejected arguments based on legislative intent,233 it is worth noting that the
Johnson approach is nevertheless in line with many of the commonly cited purposes of AEDPA. The Supreme Court resists interpretations of AEDPA “that would ‘produce troublesome results,’ ‘create procedural anomalies,’ and ‘close [its] doors to a
class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress’ intent.’” 234 This is the exact result of the Suggs approach, as explained above.235 And the Suggs
approach certainly does not serve “AEDPA’s goal of streamlining
federal habeas proceedings”236 or AEDPA’s aim to “promote[ ] judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources.”237 It also
does not serve the goal of reducing piecemeal litigation,238 as bifurcating judgments into distinct pieces, each with their own
procedural timelines, certainly seems piecemeal. The Supreme
Court has also cautioned against “clos[ing] [the] doors to a class
of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress’ intent,” particularly when petitioners risk losing the opportunity for federal review of their
claims.239 By splitting the components of a case into multiple
judgments and then barring petitions as second or successive
based on which manufactured judgment they challenge, the
court is closing the doors to the claims being raised. The
Magwood Court recognized the lack of clear congressional intent
to close these doors, referring to appeals to Congress’s intent as
“speculation.”240
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Critics of the Johnson approach allege that it undermines
the finality of trial court judgments, a result AEDPA is often
cited as aiming to prevent.241 However, as the Johnson line of
cases recognizes, this is a supposed purpose of AEDPA that the
Magwood Court explicitly rejected242 although it was heavily
emphasized in the state’s pleadings.243 The Court dismissed the
state’s finality-based argument by stating: “We cannot replace
the actual text with speculation as to Congress’ intent.”244 In addition, applying Magwood to petitions challenging an undisturbed component of a judgment would not destroy the finality
of this judgment in such a significant way that it would undermine AEDPA. As the Court in Magwood noted, even when a
habeas petition is not barred as second or successive, the other
provisions of AEDPA create high procedural hurdles that a petitioner must clear, which are aimed at preventing “abusive
claims.”245 Because the other procedural requirements of AEDPA
remain in effect when a petition is deemed not to be second or
successive, courts should not be concerned that extending
Magwood as the Johnson courts do would allow petitioners to
bring countless abusive claims. Following Johnson simply removes the limitation that, after a judgment has been amended,
petitioners may challenge only the amended component of that
judgment—Johnson permits petitioners to challenge their
amended judgments in their entirety.
CONCLUSION
Magwood’s construction of the meaning of “second or successive” must be applied to cases in which a habeas petitioner
challenges an undisturbed component of his judgment. The wellrecognized principle, advanced in Clark, that the same statutory
language must be given the same meaning in all cases arising
under the relevant statute dictates this result. AEDPA’s limitations on the filing of second or successive petitions apply to all
subsequent-in-time habeas petitions regardless of what they
241 See, for example, Suggs, 705 F3d at 285, quoting Duncan, 533 US at 178
(“AEDPA was intended more broadly to further the principles of comity, finality, and
federalism.”) (quotation marks omitted).
242 Magwood, 561 US at 331 (dismissing the state’s argument that AEDPA was intended to afford petitioners only “one opportunity” to bring a federal habeas challenge).
243 See Brief of Respondents, Magwood v Patterson, No 09-158, *46–48 (US filed
Feb 3, 2010).
244 Magwood, 561 US at 334.
245 Id at 340.
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challenge, as the statute does not contain any such restrictions
or qualifications. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the statute must apply to all cases arising under it, including
those in which a habeas petitioner challenges his underlying
conviction. Equally important to the extension of Magwood to
these cases is the definition of a judgment. Under Magwood,
whether a habeas petition is second or successive turns on
whether a new judgment exists: “[W]here . . . there is a ‘new
judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions,’ an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second
or successive.’” 246 A judgment is comprised of both the conviction(s) and sentence(s). This definition is reflected in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and has been repeatedly upheld by
the Supreme Court—both in the context of AEDPA and in other
cases in the context of criminal law. The Supreme Court has adhered to this definition of judgment in cases involving AEDPA’s
statute of limitations, and the Clark principle dictates that this
definition must also apply to the term “judgment” as used in the
context of the statute’s second or successive provisions.
In addition, the Johnson approach aligns with AEDPA’s
purposes of maintaining efficiency while preserving petitioners’
opportunity to have their claims heard. The contrary approach
produces many complexities and procedural anomalies that
AEDPA was intended to avoid, and it severely impedes petitioners’ ability to seek freedom from unlawful imprisonment. Consider Benjamin Kramer’s case. Kramer has a legitimate claim
that his detention is unlawful—the Supreme Court has vacated
a conviction in identical factual circumstances.247 However, because of the Seventh Circuit’s approach to Magwood, he cannot
challenge the conviction for which he is imprisoned. This conviction was not altered by the result of his initial habeas petition,
so, according to the court, no new judgment has been entered
with respect to this conviction. The Seventh Circuit held that a
challenge to his conviction would be second or successive despite
his genuine claim for relief, and he remains sentenced to life imprisonment for a drug offense. However, under the Johnson approach, Kramer would be able to challenge his likely unlawful
imprisonment. When a new judgment is entered, Johnson permits a petitioner to challenge the entirety of that judgment,
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rather than unjustly barring legitimate challenges to an
unamended component of the petitioner’s judgment.
In a broader sense, resolution of this circuit split is essential
to ensure that habeas petitioners everywhere have a fair opportunity to seek release from allegedly unlawful imprisonment. As
this Comment has explained, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits
preclude petitioners’ claims in a prejudicial manner that can
prevent legitimate claims from being adjudicated. People should
not be barred from bringing legitimate claims that they are unlawfully detained simply because their cases happen to arise in
jurisdictions that have declined to apply the Supreme Court’s
judgment-based approach to certain classes of federal habeas
cases. AEDPA must be applied consistently to ensure that each
person to whom it applies has a chance to seek a just resolution
of his case, which implicates serious concerns regarding his
freedom from unlawful imprisonment.

